

# Hampshire Water Transfer and Water Recycling Project

## Environmental Statement – Appendix 14.1 Stage 2 risk assessment

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# 1 Introduction

- 1.1.1 Table 1-1 and Table 1-2 set out the Stage 2 risk assessment for construction and operation. Effects from decommissioning of the Proposed Development are considered to be no greater than those identified during the construction phase and are therefore assessed to be the same as construction effects as a worst case scenario.

Table 1-1 Risk assessment and identification for construction

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
Fire	<p>Wildfire</p> <p>Fire caused by construction machinery or other construction activity incident</p> <p>Fire caused from natural source such as lightning strike</p> <p>Fire caused by human act e.g. cigarette butt</p> <p>Landfill gas</p>	<p>Dry conditions due to drought and/or heatwave enabling a fire to spread to construction machinery and other machinery and buildings</p> <p>Fire spreading from construction machinery to surrounding environment and infrastructure</p>	<p>Environmental designations</p> <p>Local community and businesses</p> <p>Cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>In Hampshire, 3,269 fires [2] were attended by the Hampshire and Isle of Wight Fire Service in 2024/25.</p> <p>Given the Proposed Development is located in the south of England, which experiences higher average temperatures and lower average volumes of precipitation than other parts of the country, the risk of a fire is likely to be greater than in other parts of the country.</p> <p>Environmental Statement (ES) Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), highlights multiple areas where the Proposed Development intersects historic landfill sites. In particular, Harts Farm landfill, which was operational from the 1960s to the 1980s, and which is located within the Order Limits, specifically with the footprint of the Water Recycling Plant (WRP) site.</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>The Contractor will include the risk of fire and the way in which they will respond to an incident in an emergency management plan which they will produce. This will be agreed with local planning authorities, in consultation with the fire and rescue/emergency services. This is contained in the Outline Construction Environmental Management Plan (CEMP) (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7) secured by a requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO (Document reference 3.1, DCO Volume 3). This includes requirements for the Contractor to set out good practice measures with regards to the storage of fuel and plant, during construction, to reduce the risk of fire, as far as possible, from these sources. For the risk of fire from landfill gas during construction, gas management will be addressed through method statements, which include monitoring gas status for safe working practices. All flammable gases will be monitored during construction activities on the landfill site with work stopped if the threshold alarm is triggered. If natural ventilation is insufficient to maintain gas concentrations at safe levels, forced ventilation may be employed by pumping air into construction shafts and vacuum extraction of air from the bottom of construction shafts. Sources of ignition will also be prevented</p>	<p>No as risk is mitigated to ALARP</p>

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
						with equipment used that is designed not to operate at high temperatures or generate sparks, as well as a no smoking or naked flames requirement enforced at the site. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).	
Unexploded ordnance (UXO)	Explosions	Disturbance of UXO during construction leading to explosion	Local community and businesses  Environmental designations  Cultural heritage and archaeology	A detailed UXO risk assessment has been undertaken for the Proposed Development and is detailed in ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). The survey examined the risk of any UXO being encountered during intrusive works during construction. The report details the risk level – from low to high – for the likelihood that the site is contaminated with UXO for different areas of the Proposed Development. This is low across the Proposed Development except for one area of moderate risk.	Fatality/injury to public  Damage to infrastructure  Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species  Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology	Various types of mitigation have been recommended in ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6), appropriate to the risk level as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Safety and Awareness Briefing</li> <li>• Site specific safety instructions</li> <li>• Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Engineer Watching Brief</li> <li>• Magnetometer surveys</li> </ul> These are secured in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7). These measures are also detailed in ES Appendix 3.1 Primary mitigation, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). For full details see ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
Bird strike at Southampton Airport	Construction of the water storage lagoons is likely to increase the number of birds at those sites during the construction phase.	Increased numbers of birds flying into the flight path for Southampton Airport. Birds flying into the engines of planes could cause them to crash.	Local community and businesses  Environmental designations  Cultural heritage and archaeology	<p>There are 21 statutory designated sites within the Zone of Influence of the Proposed Development, including Special Protection Areas (SPA), Special Areas of Conservation (SAC), Ramsar sites, Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and Local Nature Reserves. Across the Order Limits there are internationally important populations of Brent Goose and wading birds and large records of species listed as Annex 1 under the Birds Directive. For additional information, see ES Chapter 8 Terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).</p> <p>During the testing of the installed Pipeline between the WRP site and Otterbourne Water Supply Works (WSW), water storage lagoons would be required. Testing of the installed pipeline involves filling and pressurising sections of the pipeline to check for leaks or other operational issues prior to final commissioning of the section of pipeline. Water storage lagoons are not required for other pipeline components of the Proposed Development as the WRP site and Havant Thicket Reservoir can be used for this purpose. The water storage lagoons would be used to contain the potable water used for the testing of the pipeline and the cleaning of this water using a silt buster.</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>Mitigation for the risk of bird strike (birds striking planes and causing an accident) is secured in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7).</p> <p>This has been agreed with Southampton Airport and includes measures such as installation of mesh fencing around the perimeter of the temporary storage lagoon, prior to filling with water, to prevent direct movement of wildfowl from adjacent terrestrial habitat. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p>	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

Table 1-2 Risk assessment and identification for operation

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
Fire	<p>Wildfire</p> <p>Fire caused from natural source such as lightning strike</p> <p>Fire caused by human act e.g. cigarette butt</p> <p>Landfill gas</p>	<p>Dry conditions due to drought and/or heatwave enabling a fire to spread above-ground infrastructure and buildings</p> <p>Electrical equipment associated with the Proposed Development causing an underground landfill fire or above-ground fire and/or explosion</p>	<p>Environmental designations</p> <p>Local community and businesses</p> <p>Cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>In Hampshire, 3,269 fires [3] were attended by the Hampshire and Isle of Wight Fire Service in 2024/2025.</p> <p>Given the Proposed Development is located in the south of England, which experiences higher average temperatures and lower average volumes of precipitation than other parts of the country, the risk of a fire is likely to be greater than in other parts of the country.</p> <p>ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), highlights multiple areas where the Proposed Development intersects historic landfill sites. In particular, Harts Farm landfill, which was operational from the 1960s to the 1980s, and which is located within the Order Limits, specifically with the footprint of the WRP site.</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>A Landfill Gas Risk Assessment has been undertaken and is detailed in ES Appendix 11.2 Ground investigation reports, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). Ground gas protection measures will be installed where required for construction of buildings on a landfill. These measures may include the structural barrier of the floor slab, ventilation measures and a gas resistant membrane. A specialist gas protection measures designer will be engaged to design these measures. These measures are secured in the design principles for safety as set out in Design Principles Document, DCO Volume 5 (Document reference 5.11, DCO Volume 5).</p> <p>Mitigation for the risk of fire during operation of the Proposed Development is contained in the Operational Environmental Management Plan (OEMP) (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) secured by a requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO (Document reference 3.1, DCO Volume 3). The OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) requires an Emergency Response Plan to be produced at a later stage. Measures which will be included in the Emergency Response Plan include staff training, routine safety audits, rescue planning and evacuation procedures and clearly defined protocols to minimise the likelihood of fire or other hazardous incidents. There will be requirements for the WRP site and Above Ground Plant (AGP) to have emergency backup generators in the event that</p>	<p>No as risk is mitigated to ALARP</p>

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
						<p>mains power is interrupted. The measures will satisfy legislated plans and protocols, such as the Fire Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (RRO), and be in line with best practice operational protocols.</p> <p>An Emergency Response Plan will be developed and will include mitigation to deal with wildfire. Site-specific wildfire risk assessments will be undertaken and mitigation will include coordination with Fire and Rescue Services, and post-incident recovery actions. Vegetation management strategies have also been built into the design. These measures align with Natural England's NEER014 guidance and the Forestry Commission's wildfire resilience framework and relevant UK obligations under the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 and HSE Fire Safety in Construction (HSG168) guidance. This is secured through the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7).</p> <p>This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p>	
Industrial accidents	<p>Hazardous chemicals transported to, stored and used on-site</p> <p>Transport accident involving operational vehicles transporting hazardous substances</p> <p>High pressure water pipe leak or rupture</p>	<p>Explosions on the way to Proposed Development caused by collisions involving operational vehicles transporting hazardous and flammable chemicals</p> <p>Pollution of a watercourse, groundwater and surface water receptors caused by spillage of hazardous chemicals</p>	<p>Local community</p> <p>Environmental designations</p> <p>Cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>Various chemicals would be transported to, stored and used during operation of the Proposed Development. These include: antiscalant, hydrochloric acid, hydrogen peroxide, sodium hydroxide, citric acid and sodium bisulphite. A Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations assessment would be carried out by the Contractor, in adherence with regulations, to determine their levels of explosiveness, but they are all</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>Hazardous chemicals:</p> <p>Mitigation for the risk of hazardous chemical storage, use and chemical explosion during operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) in accordance with the corresponding requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO. It states that the Contractor must ensure compliance with relevant regulations. The Emergency Response Plan will contain measures on include staff training, routine safety audits, rescue</p>	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
		<p>Flooding event caused by high pressure pipe leak or rupture</p> <p>Explosive force of pipe leak or rupture leading to significant infrastructure damage</p>		<p>hazardous and explosive to some degree.</p> <p>In order to transfer a volume of 90 Ml/d the water would be pumped under high pressure, however exact velocities are not currently known.</p>		<p>planning and evacuation procedures and clearly defined protocols to minimise the likelihood of hazardous incidents. A suite of Incident Management procedures will also be produced by the contractor.</p> <p>Pollution:                      The Contractor will implement a Pollution Management Plan which will satisfy legislated plans and protocols and be in line with best practice to manage pollution for operational matters. Measures in the Plan will include response procedures, timescales and notification requirements. This is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) in accordance with the corresponding requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO. In the event of a pollution incident, the measures will be employed, as well as the aforementioned safety measures for handling hazardous chemicals if required. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p> <p>Flooding and pipe leak or rupture:                      Protective strips over the entire alignment of the pipelines constructed using open-cut methods will be identified to: ensure space and access to enable maintenance and repair, protect the integrity of the pipeline from external influences, for example loading, and protect third party assets from potential damage in the event of a rupture. The protective strip would restrict the landowner or occupier from undertaking certain activities that would restrict access to or affect the integrity of the pipeline. This includes restricting the following activities:</p>	

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
						<p>erecting, constructing or placing any building wall or other structure whether permanent or temporary, undertaking of any piling or percussive works, alteration of ground levels, planting of trees, shrubs or other species other than as set out by the Applicant's 'Guide to Tree Planting near Mains and Sewers'[4] or other relevant standards and construction or laying of new pipe duct or cable across the pipeline at an angle of less than forty-five degrees formed by the pipeline and the new pipe duct or cable. Relevant landowners will be advised of the extent of the protective strip on their land. This will be determined by the depth and location of the pipeline.</p> <p>Isolation valves will be installed on the pipeline to prevent flooding. Additional mitigation for the risk of flooding and pipe rupture during the operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) in accordance with the corresponding requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO. It requires an Emergency Response Plan to be produced at a future stage. This will include Incident Management procedures that will cover accidents and pollution from flooding from a high pressure water pipe leak or rupture. Incident classification and escalation protocols in accordance with the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 will be produced and environmental containment measures, including coordination with environmental authorities, where reasonably</p>	

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
						practicable. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.	
Pollution incidents	Hazardous chemicals transported to, stored and used on-site  Transport accident involving operational vehicles transporting hazardous substances	Pollution of a watercourse, groundwater and surface water receptors caused by spillage of hazardous chemicals  Flooding event caused by high pressure pipe leak or rupture	Local community  Environmental designations  Cultural heritage and archaeology	See industrial accidents section for baseline.	Fatality/injury to public  Damage to infrastructure  Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species  Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology	See industrial accidents section for mitigation.	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP
Flooding	High pressure water pipe leak or rupture  Interaction with Havant Thicket Reservoir  Emergency use of washouts required due to, for example, damage to the pipe caused by a third party  Emergency use of break pressure tank overflows	Flooding event caused by high pressure pipe leak or rupture  Explosive force of pipe leak or rupture leading to significant infrastructure damage  Flooding event caused by Havant Thicket Reservoir  Invasive non-native species damage habitat  Flooding of the immediate area around the washouts or break pressure tank overflows	Local community  Environmental designations  Cultural heritage and archaeology	The risk of surface water flooding across the Proposed Development varies from low to high risk. Some areas are also at risk of failure flooding by a dam or reservoir. See ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), for location specific details.  The Proposed Development would operate at its full capacity during drought conditions. Approximate maximum flows vary across the pipelines but are highest at the Pipeline between WRP site and Otterbourne WSW and Bedhampton Springs and the WRP site at approximately 90 MI/d. In order to transfer this volume of water the water would need to be pumped under high pressure. See ES Chapter 3 Description of the Proposed Development, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), for additional details.  Pipeline washouts are provided to drain down sections of the transfer pipeline. These pipeline sections are in the order of a few to several	Fatality/injury to public  Damage to infrastructure  Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species  Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology	<i>Pipe leak or rupture</i> See the industrial accidents mitigation for details on a pipe leak or rupture mitigation.  <i>Reservoir interaction</i> The potential and mitigation for an interaction between Havant Thicket Reservoir and the Proposed Development during the operational phase of the Proposed Development is examined in ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), and ES Appendix 19.1 Flood Risk Assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.  <i>Washouts</i> Mitigation for the very unlikely emergency use of washouts during the operation of the Proposed Development is secured through the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) in accordance with the corresponding requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO.	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
				<p>hundred meters long. Isolation valves are provided at each end of these pipeline sections either side of a washout, so that a particular section can be drained down as required while keeping the pipeline section on the other side full and pressurised.</p> <p>Except for the testing of the washout valves, there is no need to discharge any water from the washouts during operation. Testing of the washout valves is proposed to be undertaken using road-going tankers to capture the washout flows, so that no flows are released to the environment.</p> <p>The functions of the break pressure tank overflows are to prevent backflow and over-topping. The overflows are provided as last-resort emergency devices; by design break pressure tank overflows should never occur. Normal system controls would manage the levels within the break pressure tanks. Overflows are tested at the commissioning phase. This testing water is either potable water or uses the pipeline testing water (originally potable sourced) and the resultant volume would be tankered away for disposal so that no flows are released into the environment.</p>		<p>Washouts may be discharged to the environment without constraint where necessary to alleviate the situation and protect public safety. Following the emergency discharge, the clean-up operation would implement all reasonably practicable measures to mitigate environmental impacts. An Emergency Response Plan will be developed by the Contractor which will set out the procedures. The mitigation will follow the same measures as those set out for flooding and pipe leak or rupture.</p> <p>The risk of invasive non-native species (INNS) from the release of raw water from an emergency washout release or pipe leak or rupture will be managed through the preparation and implementation of an Emergency INNS Management Plan (EIMP) which will be developed by the Contractor post-consent as secured in the INNS Biosecurity Plan (Document reference 7.10, DCO Volume 7). The EIMP would set out the processes and procedure for releasing and managing water in an emergency, including procedures to assess and identify the current threat of INNS associated with the emergency event, for containment and eradication and a plan for regular monitoring and follow-up. Works are also proposed at Otterbourne WSW to ensure the addition of source water transferred from Havant Thicket Reservoir would not introduce pathways for the spread of INNS. The INNS Treatment would treat the waste flow that is produced by the existing treatment process at Otterbourne WSW, once all flows have passed through Otterbourne WSW. Following INNS Treatment, these</p>	

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
						<p>flows would be released to the environment via the Applicant's existing network. The INNS Treatment would produce sludge, which would be disposed of via a suitably licensed disposal facility, and would be considered to be free of INNS. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p> <p><i>Break pressure tank overflows</i></p> <p>Mitigation for the emergency use of overflows during the operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) in accordance with the corresponding requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO. It is very unlikely to occur as a situation leading to an overflow will require the simultaneous failure of all of the following multiple system elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unexpected downstream cessation or throttling of flows</li> <li>• Failure of normal automated control systems to maintain normal BPT levels</li> <li>• Undetected operationally exceptional rise in BPT levels, failure of automatic emergency response or unresponsive manual intervention from the control room upon reaction to an alarm.</li> </ul> <p>However, were this to occur and an overflow happen, the flows would eventually top the overflow within the collection chamber and flow out to the discharge location. If the overflow volume is less than the effective volume of the collection chamber, i.e. the overflow stops before reaching</p>	

Risk event [1]	Source	Pathway	Receptor	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to MAD with mitigation in place?
						the outlet to discharge, no flows will be released to the environment, and this volume will be removed by suction tanker. In the case of a flooding event, the mitigation would be the same as that set out for pipe leak or rupture. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.	
Transport accidents	<p>Transport accident involving operational vehicles transporting hazardous substances</p> <p>Hazardous chemicals transported to, stored and used on-site</p> <p>Transport accident involving operational vehicles</p>	<p>Explosions on the way to site caused by collisions involving operational vehicles transporting hazardous chemicals</p> <p>Pollution of a watercourse, groundwater and surface water receptors caused by spillage of hazardous chemicals</p> <p>Collision between site vehicles and/or non-site related vehicles</p>	<p>Local community</p> <p>Environmental designations</p> <p>Cultural heritage</p>	For the baseline for the hazardous chemicals to be used on-site see the industrial accidents section.	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p>	ES Chapter 18 Traffic and transport, Volume 1 (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), assesses the risks associated with hazardous loads during operation of the Proposed Development. It concludes that the minor increase in daily vehicle movements involving hazardous loads means there is no likely significant effect and therefore the risk is negligible. If a spillage were to occur, the pollution prevention measures set out in the industrial accidents: hazardous chemicals section will mitigate the risk. This mitigation reduces this risk to ALARP. For risks associated with hazardous loads see the industrial accidents section in Table 1-2. For risks associated with pollution incidents see the pollution incidents section in Table 1-2.	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP
System failures	Failure of the WRP	Failure of the WRP leading to raw water polluting Havant Thicket Reservoir	Local community and businesses	The WRP site is located at a site north-west of Budds Farm Wastewater Treatment Works (WTW) providing up to (especially during drought conditions) approximately 60 megalitres per day (MI/d) of recycled water. The WRP would have a minimum output of approximately 10MI/d. At maximum operation the WRP would also produce a maximum output of approximately 22MI/d of reject water. Pumping stations would be located at the WRP site to pump process waste to the existing sewer network	Fatality/injury to public	All the pumps and equipment in the pumping stations at the WRP site are equipped with remote monitoring and control which will indicate an issue with water quality were there to be a problem. The WRP site will be operational 24 hours a day and it is assumed that operatives will be in attendance 24 hours a day with approximately five operatives during the day and three during the night. An emergency generator will be provided as part of the WRP site which will be used when required. The emergency generator will be a	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

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				for transfer to Budds Farm WTW, recycled water to Bedhampton Springs and source water (from the reservoir) to Otterbourne WSW.		<p>fuel powered generator used to create electrical power in an emergency situation, for example during lack of power. In these events, the emergency generator will run until power to the WRP site is returned. This mitigation reduces this risk to ALARP.</p> <p>The OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) requires the Contractor to develop an Emergency Response Plan which will include a suite of Incident Management procedures which are to be used in circumstances that are unplanned and require an immediate response. These will complement and be consistent with the Pollution Management Plan, setting out procedures to manage water quality in the event of an incident, in alignment with legislated plans and protocols and industry best practice. This is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) in accordance with the corresponding requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO. This mitigation reduces this risk to ALARP.</p>	

## References

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The Southern Water logo graphic consists of three stylized, white, wavy lines that resemble water waves, positioned to the right of the word 'Water'.